MORGANTOWN - In his first 53 games as West Virginia's football coach, Dana Holgorsen had been forced 331 times to make a decision. His offense, which is to say his treasure, was facing fourth down and he could either punt it or go for it. For one reason or another, be it field position or the score, a field goal was not an option, and Holgorsen was left to decide whether it was wiser to put his defense back on the field or give his offense one more chance to stay out there.
Prompted either by opportunity, strategy or necessity, he went for the first down 94 times and succeeded 40 times. He decided to punt 237 times.
"I know the percentages say that coaches don't go for it enough on fourth down," he said.
For Holgorsen, it's a call that relies on variables, fluid ones that can change from season to season, game to game and quarter to quarter. There's more to it than the score and the stage of the game or the yards needed to move the chains. Is the offense in a groove? Can the defense handle a quick change of possession and momentum? Are short-yardage plays likely to succeed? Can receivers run the routes needed against the defense they see?
He considered everything again Saturday, his 54th game with the Mountaineers, one he'd win 45-6, and on fourth-and-2 at his 44-yard line with a 28-0 lead in the second quarter, he asked Nick O'Toole to punt.
For the 332nd time, he chose one or the other. The next time, he chose both.
Special teams coach Joe DeForest called a fake punt up 38-0 in the third quarter, on a fourth-and-12, no less. It was the first in Holgorsen's five seasons and the first for WVU since 2008.
"It was definitely a game plan thing," DeForest said.
It's a 2015 thing, too. More and more now, fourth downs are simply the downs after third downs, another opportunity to get yards or even score. More and more now, coaches are compelled to take a risk.
They know offenses are more potent than ever and possessions are valuable commodities that shouldn't always be traded for a punt and field position, and field position isn't quite as critical these days when offenses can gain yards in chunks or string together short gains in quick succession. Many can even do both.
Every time an offense gives away a chance to score, especially in favorable field position, if gives the other offense the same opportunity. Do that too much and you cannot win in today's college football.
So coaches go to studies and statistics, and they discover or are convinced it doesn't make sense to punt inside the opponent's territory - because it doesn't. For proof, look at Maryland's Randy Edsall, the loose grip he has on his job, the two punts from WVU's territory last week and the four other times he's done it this season with an erratic offense that can't compensate for a soft defense.
His offense has 13 touchdowns. Opposing offenses have 18. He's punted six times from the side of the field you'd think he'd like to spend more time on.
In most other places, teams give time and attention to fourth down. They have plays they like for certain situations that, much like they do for two-point conversions. But defenses also play defense on fourth down, and if they were successful on the first three downs, they probably have a good chance to succeed on the fourth. This is why fake punts are interesting and why teams are becoming increasingly clever with their punt returns.
Utah went to Oregon last Saturday and won 62-20. That's a lot of points, but teams generally need a lot of points to beat the Ducks. The Utes scored plenty, but they also took plenty. Up 41-13 in the second half, the punter ran 33 yards on a fake. Utah scored. Oregon punted on the next possession and everyone went to the right, including a punt returner - but not the punt returner. The punt actually went to the left, where one Utah player caught it and ran 69 yards for another score.
This is happening more and more in college and the NFL, and it's another illustration of how to treat fourth downs.
For DeForest, fake punts are ways to warn and worry future opponents, but also ways to steal possessions from the present opponent.
"Only if you can execute it," he said. "We have a fake going in every single week. Whether it's executable is the thing."
Getting caught comes with a consequence, and he spend hours going over everything the opponent does so that he can find a clean getaway. The Terrapins showed him something on film and then on the field. He saw Maryland's alignment - 10 players on the line of scrimmage - and knew the ball was on the right side of the field. He knew the Terrapins had one of the nation's best punt returners and that they would doing everything possible give Will Likely a chance, which, again, is a team treating a fourth down special.
"You've got to mix things up each week," DeForest said. "As a punt return unit, you can't tip your hand. They were so dangerous in the punt return game because they sold everyone out on holding our guys up. We had to come up with something to take the heat off our coverage team, and that'll help us throughout the year.
"Teams will know, 'Hey, they'll fake it.' If we can loosen teams up and give our guys a chance to cover kicks, it'll get a lot easier."
That's especially important Saturday, when the Mountaineers deal with Oklahoma punt returner Sterling Shepard. Special teams in general looms large because last year the Mountaineers had a touchdown lead on the Sooners late in the first half and then surrendered a kickoff return touchdown.
"We'd seized all the momentum in that game and they seized it right back with the kick return," Holgorsen said. "That will be something that will be addressed this week."
Last week, DeForest predicted the Terrapins would flood to the left side of the field on the snap, and he was correct. The right side opened and the three-man shield shepherded O'Toole to the first down.
WVU is still learning to walk again on punt returns, so it may be a bit much to expect deceitful returns or throwbacks across the field, but those are things DeForest looks for when he's learning about the other team.
"It has to be something where you say, 'Well, they're leaving this wide open,' or maybe they're not, and they're lane-conscious and contain-conscious," he said. "It's what people give you. Are you trying fool them or are they giving you something? Those are two different ways to look at it.
"No. 1 is, 'I don't care how they lineup, we're going to fool them on this. We're going to trick them.' The other is, 'Look, they're susceptible on this. We can get this.' One is a 50-50 chance. The other is a 100-percent chance, where if they give you this, you can get it, but you've got to execute it."